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Abstract. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) provide sensing and monitoring services by means of
many tiny autonomous devices equipped with wireless radio transceivers. As WSNs are deployed on a
large-scale and/or on long-term basis, not only traditional security but also privacy issues must be taken
into account. Furthermore, when network operators offer on-demand access to sensor measurements to
their clients, query mechanisms should ideally leak neither client interests nor query patterns. In this
paper, we present a privacy-preserving WSN query mechanism that uses standard cryptographic tech-
niques. Besides preventing unauthorized entities from accessing sensor readings, it minimizes leakage
of (potentially sensitive) information about users’ query targets and patterns.
1 Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are emerging as a practical and powerful approach to a wide range of
monitoring problems. WSN nodes can collectively monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as
temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollution [32]. However, due to limited resources (compu-
tation, storage, bandwidth and, especially, battery power) operations on sensors must be carefully designed.
Moreover, once deployed, sensors might operate in a hostile environment and can thus run the risk of various
attacks. Besides the usual security issues, WSNs also face the problem of minimizing the security-related
overhead, in terms of computation, memory and bandwidth. Over the last decade, much effort has been put
into lightweight security techniques geared for WSNs. Promising results have been obtained in key manage-
ment [16, 26], secure routing (see Section 2), authentication [31], as well as secure data aggregation [9, 8]. For
an overview of security issues in WSNs, we refer to [30].
At the same time, as WSNs grow in popularity, the issues of privacy are beginning to surface. So far, it
has been often assumed that the information gathered by WSN nodes is ultimately destined for the owner
of the network represented by a base station or a sink. However, this assumption does not necessarily hold.
The owner and the operator of the network could well be two different entities, similarly to the recent trend
of the Database-As-Service model and Software-as-a-Service model (SaaS).
One likely implication is that the WSN is somehow connected to the global Internet via some kind of a
gateway and offers data reading/collection service to commercial users.
We consider, for instance, a large long-term WSN deployed for measuring urban pollution levels. This
WSN might be owned by the city but its operation can be outsourced to a private contractor. The owner
(city) might certify WSN nodes and even initialize them securely. However, day-to-day operation is out of
its hands. The contractor provides and manages the interface to the Internet. Moreover, all queries to the
WSN must pass through the contractor-owned gateway. A client can request readings from particular sensors
at particular locations. As a result, examining privacy threats from the client’s perspective becomes both
important and interesting. Sensitive information includes nodes or locations queried and the frequency of
querying a specific location. We consider as another example the Ocean Tracking Network [3], launched in
June 2008, a $168-million project using sensor networks to track movements and behavior of several marine
species in 14 ocean regions. Although the project is managed by scientists in Canada, the operators of the
network are different global private partners. Preserving privacy becomes a desirable feature of such sensor
networks, whenever scientists aim to conduct confidential researches, or users collect readings for business
? Preliminary version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of ICCCN’09 under the same title.
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purposes. Within this setting, the network operator becomes a severe threat, since it participates in the data
collection process.
A na¨ıve approach to address this problem would be for the client to always query the entire set of
sensors. This would achieve perfect privacy but would result in a massive waste of energy. Clearly, efficiency
and resource constraints must be taken into account. Another natural solution would be to constantly collect
all sensor readings in real time, store them at some (external) server and allow clients to query the database
on that server. Privacy issues would then be reduced to the well-known Private Information Retrieval (PIR)
problem [12]. However, though popular in the cryptographic research literature, the state-of-the-art in PIR
has not reached the point of being practical.
Contributions. This paper presents a privacy-preserving query mechanism that allows an external client
to collect readings from sensors of his interests without leaking their identities to adversaries including the
network operator. Our scheme is based on a technique similar to onion routing [33]. However, it is necessary
to overcome several obstacles in order to integrate onion routing with sensor networks, such as the constraints
of computation overhead and the packet length, or the presence of multiple malicious nodes in the network.
We analyze the security and performance of the mechanism and provide analytical results to show both its
effectiveness and its limited overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in the next section. Our system
setting is described Section 3, followed by the problem definition in Section 4. Section 5 presents a new
privacy-preserving query protocol for generic WSNs. Its security and performance are analyzed in Section 6.
We then present two extensions in Section 7. The results are summarized in Section 8.
2 Related Work
Techniques for anonymous communication across untrusted networks date back to Chaum’s pioneering work
on MixNets [10]. Today’s state-of-the-art is exemplified by TOR [14]. TOR is geared for low-latency syn-
chronous communication over the Internet and is based on the so-called Onion Routing principle [33]. In this
scheme, each router can only identify the previous and the next hop along a route. However, the sequence
of routers must be selected and fixed at connection setup. This task is performed by a special entity (TOR
proxy).
Other notable prior work focused specifically on MANETs or WSNs. Secure Dynamic Distributed Routing
(SDDR) protocol [15] uses Onion Routing to achieve route anonymity, but does not protect anonymity of
source and destination. Anonymous On-Demand Routing (ANODR) is geared for ad hoc networks [22]; it
supports untraceable routes or packet flows, with a route pseudonymity approach which decouples a node’s
location from its identity. ANODR is based on “broadcast with trapdoor information”: by embedding certain
trapdoor information (known only to the receiver), data is delivered to the receiver but not to other members
in the group. However, the identity of the destination is disclosed to nodes along the route and these nodes
also gain knowledge of the number of hops from the source. Other interesting results include: SDAR [6] and
MASK [39]. However, as pointed out in [35], all these schemes – including ANODR and SDDR – have a
common drawback: a passive adversary monitoring all network traffic (without knowledge of any keys) can
trace the route reply (RREP) message from destination back to the source.
There are also some prior results in the area of privacy-awareness in location-based services, ubiquitous
environments and wireless sensor networks, such as [18, 29], where attempts are made to avoid disclosure of
the node’s location.
Other related work aims to achieve anonymity in WSNs by obfuscating nodes’ identifiers. The work in
[37] is the first attempt in this direction, with the assumption that sensors are anonymous, i.e., a sensor
has no initial unique identifier. Nodes are organized in clusters and are aware of their own location. The
attacker wants to identify and eliminate the minimum number of nodes to inflict maximum loss of data.
Two anonymous schemes for clustered WSNs are proposed in [27] to provide anonymity, assuming secret
keys shared between sensors and the base station are not compromised. Moreover, nodes in a cluster are
considered indistinguishable. Anonymous routing is performed by using pseudonyms to keep node identity
private in route requests and replies. In [28], two anonymity techniques are proposed, both based on one-way
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keyed hash chains. It is assumed that every sensor is aware of its own location and communicates it to the
base station. An adversary may eavesdrop on communication and may compromise sensors (to obtain data
and individual as well as pairwise encryption keys). The first scheme uses a one-way keyed hash chain to
generate a sequence of hash values, each serving as a one-time ID; the second scheme proposes a reverse
hashing method.
More recently, [7] presented a scheme that attempts providing query privacy in WSNs. The scheme uses
two servers. If these two servers collude, privacy is completely compromised. Furthermore, each sensor needs
to store a key for each client, thus resulting in a linear increase in storage overhead. Finally, a scheme for
anonymous data collection in WSNs was presented in [20]. The security of this scheme is based on data
perturbation1, rather than on provably secure cryptographic techniques.
In addition, related research was performed in mid-90s to secure itinerant mobile agents computation. A
mobile agent can be viewed as a process moving from one site to another, preserving its state and data. A
mobile agent can autonomously decide when and where to move. Mobile agents can be used to complete a
set of user tasks in an asynchronous, dynamic and heterogeneous environments. For instance, a mobile agent
can be used to perform an online ticket reservation. The user launches the agent which migrates from site
to site in order to find the best price. An overview of this paradigm – along with associated security issues
– is given in [11]. However, no practical solutions were proposed.
Another related work in [24] aims to provide both anonymity (of both sender and receiver) and unlinka-
bility. Since mobile agents can self-navigate through the network, the standard onion routing techniques do
not apply, since a route is not known at the source. However, in our scenario, the route is chosen at the start
by the client who knows the topology of the WSN. Moreover, [24] provides no details about key management.
Finally, directed diffusion [21] has been employed in WSN to globally address a query to all sensors.
However, in our setting such solutions would leak information to malicious nodes near the gateway.
3 The Setting
We consider a WSN consisting of n nodes that we denote by: {S1, · · · , Sn}. The owner of the WSN is referred
to as OWN and the operator as OPR. As mentioned earlier, these are two distinct entities. Once a sensor
obtains environment measurements, it can store the results locally (at least for a short while).
Before deploying the WSN, OWN chooses a symmetric key encryption scheme E(·), e.g., Rijndael [13].
It also initializes a set of parameters for a light-weight and bandwidth-efficient public key scheme [4] denoted
by EP(·). One very appropriate choice of EP(·) is the 160-bit Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
(ECIES) [4], which we present in Appendix.
Next, OWN assigns to each Si a public key yi and a private key xi for EP(·). Then, acting as a
Certification Authority (CA), OWN issues to each Si a certificate binding Si to yi.2 All other tasks are
delegated to OPR. At setup time, OPR publishes the network topology, and node identities: {S1, · · · , Sn}
along with their respective locations and certified public keys. In addition, we assume that each Si shares a
unique symmetric key with its adjacent neighbors.
The network operates in a read-on-demand model, i.e., it responds to external clients’ queries. Clients
reach the WSN through a gateway, denoted by GW, which belongs to OPR.
To obtain data from a certain sensor, a user (Alice) forms a query and sends it to GW, which, in turn,
communicates with the relevant sensor(s). The queried sensor performs requested measurements and returns
the results to Alice, again, via GW.
4 The Privacy Problem
We decouple security and privacy issues. In our context, the former includes data secrecy, data integrity and
authentication. They apply to data provided by the queried sensor: data must be read only by the requesting
1 Sample of the data complement is transmitted to the base station instead of the actual data.
2 In fact, it is probably just as easy for OWN to issue a single “communal” certificate to all sensors.
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client; it cannot be replayed, modified or manufactured by the adversary, denoted by ADV. Techniques to
provide these security services are standard and do not present a challenge.
The privacy problem is more difficult. We need to ensure that the identity of the queried sensor remains
secret to ADV. Recall that, in our case, OPR owns GW and is thus a potential adversary. As a consequence,
we also need to keep the content of the reply secret, but for reasons different than simply thwarting unau-
thorized eavesdroppers. In practice, data collected by sensors is not random; it might depend on the sensor’s
location. Therefore, if ADV is allowed to see the reply data, it could determine the location of that data’s
origin and, hence, the target sensor.
We do not consider privacy of the external client, i.e., we assume that Alice is unconcerned about ADV
knowing that she is querying the WSN. (If this is not the case, techniques like TOR [14] can readily handle
building an anonymous channel between Alice and GW.) Finally, we note that denial of service (DoS) attacks
are out of scope of this paper.
4.1 Portrait of the Adversary
We consider an adversary ADV who, as mentioned above, controls OPR and GW. In addition, we allow
ADV to compromise up to z sensors where, 0 ≤ z ≤ n. We call these z sensors infected. Once a sensor is
infected, ADV learns all of its secret keys, and can thus obtain the plaintext of all incoming and outgoing
messages.
Although it controls both GW and z sensors, we only consider an honest-but-curious ADV [17]. We
assume that each infected sensor can only eavesdrop on packets in its physical proximity. In other words,
ADV behaves as a normal sensor during protocol execution (though, it may misuse acquired information). Of
course, this generally passive stance does not prevent ADV from playing the role of some legitimate external
user and issuing its own queries.
4.2 Our Goal
The goal of our work is to keep the identity of the queried sensor secret. By monitoring many of Alice’s
queries, ADV should only gain a negligible advantage in determining the target sensor. Obviously, if ADV
makes a random guess, its success probability should be is 1/n, assuming that query targets are uniformly
distributed across the whole WSN. Note that the number of infected nodes has a significant implication on
the security notion and on choosing the appropriate approaches. Two extreme scenarios are as follows:
– [z = 0] – ADV controls nothing other than GW. In such scenario, ADV can not eavesdrop on any inter-
sensor communication. Since ADV is at its weakest, solutions can be quite efficient. For instance, one
simple approach is to link-encrypt all traffic between GW and all other sensors on the path. We note
that this is exactly the level of privacy offered by [7].
– [z = n] – ADV controls all sensors as well as GW. Namely, ADV monitors all traffic in the WSN. This
requires the strongest privacy protection. The situation bears a lot of resemblance to PIR [12]. It is thus
expected (and likely unavoidable) that schemes offering this level of privacy are impractical, because the
computation complexity of any solution is at least linear in terms of WSN size. However, in this worst
case, k-anonymity can be achieved.3
This paper considers a more realistic scenario where 0 z  n. In other words, ADV controls a fraction of
sensors. We argue that, if the WSN coverage area is small, ADV already has enough a priori knowledge of
user queries. Moreover, for a small-scale WSN, a trivial privacy approach is to query all nodes, as in a na¨ıve
PIR scheme. On the other hand, a large-scale WSN could consist of thousands of sensors, each covering a
relatively small area. It is reasonable to assume that ADV cannot compromise enough sensors to fully cover
the entire area covered by the WSN.
3 We recall that k-anonymity is defined in [36] as follows: ... A release provides k-anonymity protection if the informa-
tion for each person contained in the release cannot be distinguished from at least k-1 individuals whose information
also appears in the release.
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4.3 Challenges
Our scheme is built upon the onion routing technique whereby sensors play the role of an onion router.
Though this technique has been intensively studied for Internet-based communications, we have to carefully
tackle the following issues to fully solve the problem above.
– Data Collection: The reading from a sensor needs to be returned to a client. In the Internet-based
onion routing, the receiver can reply to the sender by constructing a new onion with data enclosed.
Such a model is not applicable in sensor networks, because it is too expensive for a sensor to construct
an onion. Therefore, the queried sensor has to inject the reading and forward it to the client, without
compromising the privacy.
– Onion Size: In an Internet onion routing scheme, a node can forward the onion to its next hop via a
TCP connection, which does not has any restriction on the onion size. In sensor networks, there is no
TCP-like reliable transport protocol. It is expensive for a sensor to buffer packets and application data
is always encapsulated into a single packet. Therefore, our protocol does not allow an onion larger than
the maximum packet size, which is 128 bytes if using the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Such a constraint
affects the maximum number of layers an onion can have.
– Energy Consumption: As in many other sensor network applications, it is among the top priori-
ties to preserve the sensor’s energy. This restricts the sensor’s cost for both the computations and the
communications, i.e. receiving and transmitting an onion.
5 Basic Construction
Fig. 1. Route Example with t = 8
The basic idea behind our scheme is to provide anonymity using an onion routing-like technique. To
obtain better privacy, we require for each node in the onion route to contribute its own reading. In current
onion routing solutions (e.g., TOR), the last hop on the onion route is the destination. This information
leakage should be avoided in our protocol due to the presence of infected nodes.
We assume that Alice knows the topology of the network. However, we argue that such assumption is
realistic in the applications we consider (cf Section 1). In scenarios such as the urban pollution measurement
service, the user is fully aware of the nodes in the network although the network itself is operated by an
external contractor.
Alice selects a route which includes the target and a set of other randomly chosen sensors. Both the
first and the last hop of the route are set to GW. Alice constructs the query by performing a number of
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encryptions, each analogous to an onion layer. The query is then forwarded to GW. In the end, Alice receives
a reply (through GW) which she processes to obtain the desired measurements.
The WSN query mechanism is composed of three algorithms: 1) query generation, 2) data collection, and
3) data recovery. Alice generates a query and sends it to GW, which runs the data collection algorithm and
returns the outcome to Alice. Alice then runs the data recovery algorithm to obtain the readings.
In the rest of the paper, we use the notation in the following Table.
Symbol Meaning
n total number of sensors
G WSN connectivity/topology graph
z number of infected (compromised) sensors
t onion route length in hops;
(usually related to the WSN diameter)
m, c plaintext and ciphertext
Si i-th sensor; 0 ≤ i < n
yi, xi Si’s public and private keys
EPj(m) public key encryption
( of message m with key yj )
DPj(c) public key decryption
( of ciphertext c with key xj )
E(k,m) symmetric key encryption
( of message m with key k )
D(k, c) symmetric key decryption
( of ciphertext c with key k )
Lr bit size of one sensor reading
Lc bit size of onion header
5.1 Query Generation
Suppose that Alice wants to query a sensor Sa. The query consists of two parts:
1. Header: an onion-like structure which governs how sensors forward and respond to the query. The header
has t + 1 layers, each corresponding to a sensor hop on the route, where t is a fixed public parameter
chosen by Alice. (We expect t to be closely related to WSN diameter). The size of the header is also
fixed – Lc bits – as the maximum WSN packet length.
2. Body: a random-looking binary string that carries the readings back to Alice. It is comprised of t slots,
each containing an Lr-bit reading. The positions of sensor readings are randomly permuted by Alice.
(As described later, each onion layer tells the corresponding sensor the slot index within the body where
to deposit its encrypted reading.) This way, an intermediate node is unaware of its position in the route.
Path Selection. Using the publicly known WSN topology, Alice selects a random path (containing Sa) of
length t+ 2:
〈Si0 , Si1 , · · · , Sit , Sit+1〉
where all pairs Sij , Sij+1 (0 ≤ j ≤ t + 1) are immediate neighbors and, for some v ∈ [1, t], Siv = Sa.
However, GW and Si0 (as well as Sit+1 and GW) are not required to be adjacent4. In other words, Alice
constructs a (t + 3)-hop circuit which starts with GW, runs through (t + 2) sensors (among which is Sa)
and ends back at GW. See Figure 1 for an example. The path selection process is shown in more detail in
Algorithm 1.
Header Construction. First, Alice creates a random permutation of indices {1, 2, · · · , t} which we denote
4 As the end-points of the path, Si0 and Sit+1 are assumed to be “visible” (known) to GW.
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Fig. 2. The final onion (header) built by Alice.
as: pi = {p1, p2, · · · , pt}. Each pj is used to inform Sij (j-th node in the path) where to insert its reading
within the body. Furthermore, we define p0 = 0 and pt+1 = 0. This is to instruct the end-points of the path
(Si0 and Sit+1) that their readings are not needed, since they are both visible to GW. Next, Alice generates
a set of t random symmetric (e.g., Rijndael) keys: k1, ..., kt and sets k0 = kt+1 = 0.
She then constructs the header by setting ORt+2 = ∅ and encrypting < kt+1,GW, pt+1, ORt+2 > with
yit+1 , i.e. Sit+1 ’s public key. Let:
ORt+1 = EPit+1(〈 kt+1,GW, pt+1, ORt+2〉 )
denote the resulting ciphertext.
Then, she encrypts < kt, Sit+1 , pt, ORt+1 > with yit , which results in:
ORt = EPit(〈 kt, Sit+1 , pt, ORt+1〉 ) (1)
Alice repeats this process, until computing OR0 – encryption of < k0, Si1 , p0, OR1 > under yi0 .
The resulting final onion is showed in Figure 2.
Since the size of the header grows after each encryption, we apply the technique in [19] to keep ciphertext
size constant. This approach will prevent any sensor on the onion route from determining its position within
the route. The resulting header is an Lc-bit string.
Body Construction. The initial body M0 is just a random binary string of size Lr ∗ t. During the data
collection phase, random bits are gradually replaced with encrypted readings.
The query construction algorithm outputs the initial query 〈OR0,M0〉. Alice then sends it to GW which,
forwards it intact to Si0 . Upon receiving the query, each sensor runs Algorithm 2 and forwards the query to
the next hop.
5.2 Data Collection
When Sij receives 〈ORj ,Mj〉, it decrypts ORj and obtains: permuted position pj (in the body) for depositing
its reading, next hop Sij+1 , one-time secret key kj and inner onion ORj+1 destined for Sij+1 . (Recall that, if
pj = 0, no data is solicited.) Details are shown in Algorithm 2. Each sensor in the route performs the same
sequence of steps. It is easy to see that the client’s actual target sensor Sa can not determine its “special”
role.
With every collection step (hop), a layer of the onion is consumed and the size of the header decreases after
each decryption. The difference in size can be exploited by ADV(or the current-hop sensor), to determine
the position of the current hop in the route. To overcome the problem, we use the approach introduced in
[19]. Alice introduces a random δ-bit string as padding in the innermost onion and then trims it after every
encryption such that the final onion size is always Lc-bits. Sij consumes one layer of the onion and restores
its size by appending random bits. This way, neither an eavesdropper nor a sensor in path can derive the
7
Algorithm 1: Path Selection: executed by a WSN client (Alice)
Input: (Sa, t, {S1, · · · , Sn}, G)
1 Generate random w ∈r {1, ..., t}
2 Let iw = a /* Sa sits randomly in the path */
3 for (j ← w − 1 to 0) do
Select Sij as a random neighbor of Sij+1
4 Let P = {Si0 , Si1 , ..., Siw} where Siw = Sa
5 If (P contains a loop) go to 1
6 for (j ← w + 1 to t) do
Select Sij as a random neighbor of Sij−1
7 Let P ′ = {Siw+1 , Siw+2 , ..., Sit}
8 If (P ′ contains a loop) OR (P ∩ P ′ 6= ∅) go to 7
9 Return Path =< GW, P, P ′,GW >
Algorithm 2: Data Collection: executed by Sij , 0 ≤ j ≤ t+ 1
Input: (ORj ,Mj)
1 Decrypt ORj using xij . Abort of failure.
2 Parse decrypted string as: < kj , Sij+1 , pj , ORj+1 >.
3 Pad ORj+1 with randomness up to Lc bits.
4 if (pj 6= 0) then
Obtain local reading αj
/*Let Mj [pj ] be the pj-th Lr-bit block of Mj */
Set Mj [pj ] = αj
5 for (s← 1 to t) do
/* Let Mj [s] be the s-th Lr-bit block of Mj */
Set Mj+1[s] = E(kj ,Mj [s])
/* each block is encrypted separately */
6 Send 〈 ORj+1,Mj+1〉 to Sij+1
current (relative) position in the route from the current header size. (However, the last hop is aware of its
position in the route since the next hop is GW.) Finally, upon receipt of 〈 ORt+2,Mt+2 〉, GW forwards it
intact to Alice. We refer to [19] for the discussion on trimming and padding that keep the onion size constant.
5.3 Data Recovery
Alice recovers the reading by unraveling layer-by-layer Mt+2 received from GW. Recall that Mt+2 is a
concatenation of concentrically-encrypted t + 2 blocks of ciphertext. Among them, Alice is only interested
in one block at position pv – the one containing the reading from the target sensor Sa = Siv . According to
the data collection algorithm, this block is encrypted by Siv and super-encrypted by all subsequent hops in
the route. There are thus (t+ 2− v) layers of encryption (with keys {kv, ..., kt+1}, respectively) which must
be stripped off one-by-one in order for Alice to obtain αv. The recovery phase is shown in Algorithm 3.
6 Analysis
6.1 Security Analysis
We note that observing the onion does not reveal any information apart from the next hop of the route.
After decrypting an incoming onion, a sensor obtains an inner onion. Every onion is in fact the ciphertext of
a public key envelope encryption. Therefore, given a semantically secure public key encryption scheme, the
onion reveals no information except its length, provided that the sensor does not possess the corresponding
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Algorithm 3: Data Recovery: executed by a WSN client (Alice).
Input: (ORt+2,Mt+2)
/* Recall that ORt+2 = ∅ */
1 Let TMP = Mt+2[pv]
/* pv-th Lr-bit block of Mt+2 */
2 for (s← t+ 1 to v) do
Set TMP = D(ks, TMP )
/* kv is the last decryption key */
3 Parse TMP as: < αv >
/* abort if error */
4 Output αv
/* reading from target sensor Siv = Sa*/
private key. Moreover, all sensors in the route perform the same operation. Thus, even knowledge of a sensor’s
position in the onion route does not yield the location of the actual target sensor.
Number of Exposed/Known Nodes. We now analyze the information that ADV obtains by observing
a node in the onion route.
ADV cannot recover any information about the previous node since no sender information is present in
most WSN routing protocols. However, ADV can easily see the next hop since destination is visible. This
way, for every infected node, ADV learns the identity of two hops in the onion route.
We introduce the term known nodes, to describe the set of hops in the route known to ADV. Note that
not all of them are directly infected. From now on, we denote with x the number of known nodes, and we
show that it can be expressed it in terms of n, z and t.
To compute the number of expected known nodes, we consider, for every node in the onion: (i) the prob-
ability that the node is infected, i.e., zn , (ii) the probability that the node is not infected but its predecessor
in the onion is, i.e., zn · n−zn .
As a result, the expected number of known nodes among t onion sensors is:
E(x) = t ·
(
z
n
+
z
n
· n− z
n
)
(2)
We remark that the number in (2) has also been validated by running the following experiment. We simulated
sensor networks of different sizes n, where we selected z-out-of-n nodes to simulate infected nodes. Finally,
we counted the number of known nodes. (We recall that a node is “known” if the node itself or its predecessor
in the route is infected). The experiments were repeated 10,000 times to average the values, which proved
to match our analytical formula in (2). (Results are not enclosed due to lack of space).
Target Sensor Privacy. Our goal is to protect the privacy of the target sensor. To this aim, we compute
the probability of ADV breaking the query privacy: ADV successfully guesses which sensor in the network is
the query target.
We remark that requesting t nodes to report their readings makes the scheme at worst t-anonymous.
Therefore, the above probability is upper-bounded by 1/t. However, we argue that our idea to combine
onion routing techniques with t-anonymity provides much stronger privacy.
The probability of breaking the privacy depends on the different network and adversarial parameters: z,
the number of infected nodes; x, the number of known nodes on the onion route; n, the size of the network;
t, the onion size. When guessing, ADV can exclude the z infected nodes which are not touched by the route,
and use the information of the known nodes on the route.
Hence, the probability of ADV successfully guessing the query target based on x known nodes is:
1
n−z+x− zn ·n−zn ·t
, hence:
Pr(ADV breaks privacy) = 1
n− z + t · z/n (3)
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To show the effectiveness and the scalability of our privacy solution, we plot the above probability
with different adversarial and network settings. Figure 3 shows that for different network sizes, namely
n = 100, 1000, and 10000, using a constant size onion route of t = 20 hops, the probability of ADV breaking
the privacy scales according to the ratio of infected nodes. The worst case, i.e. t-anonimity is reached for
100% of infected nodes.
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Fig. 3. Probability of ADV breaking query privacy
Finally, we stress that, since the worst case for our scheme is t-anonymity, we can let the client select the
same route for the same queried node. Thus, ADV can not intersect its views of query executions.
6.2 Performance Analysis
Both query generation and data recovery algorithms are executed by a client (external to the WSN) which
has sufficient computing resources to handle standard cryptographic operations. Therefore, our performance
analysis only focuses on sensor energy consumption due the execution of the data collection algorithm and
in forwarding an onion.
Using experiment results from the relevant literature, we estimate the computation energy cost of the
sensors on the onion route. Note that sensors not on the route do not perform any computation and the
expensive onion generation is done by the client instead of a sensor. A sensor on the route performs only one
ECC decryption and one Rijndael encryption. We refer to a configurable ECC engine – TinyECC [25]. [2]
shows that an Imote2 (13MHz) consumes 13.73 mJ in performing a 160-ECC decryption. An earlier result
in [23] measured the cost of symmetric key encryption in sensors. According to it, speed-optimized Rijndael
in CBC mode requires around 350 CPU cycles to encrypt a 90-byte message. Based on the Imote2 data-sheet
[2], the CPU of Imote2 operates at low voltage (0.85v) and low frequency (13MHz). Thus, we estimate that
one Rijndael-CBC decryption of an onion costs roughly 1 mJ (CPU only), which is negligible as compared
with the cost of public key (e.g., ECIEC) operations.
Another factor in energy consumption is due to onion forwarding. The maximum size of a TinyOS packet
is 128 bytes [1], including 11-byte header and 2-byte CRC. According to the CC2420 data-sheet, for the
radio transceiver of Imote2, it costs about 123mK and 114mJ to receive and transmit a 128-byte packet,
respectively. Therefore, the total estimated energy cost for a sensor on the route is roughly 250mJ .
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The proposed scheme significantly saves energy compared to reading all the sensors. Indeed, energy
consumption of sensor nodes is affected mainly by communication rather than computation, and reading all
sensors entails significant communication overhead. Compared to the PIR approach mentioned in Section 1,
our scheme is also more cost-effective. In our solution, sensors are awakened only when reached by a query.
In contrast, the PIR approach awakens all sensors periodically, even if some readings are not requested.
Onion route length. The size of the packet limits the query header size, and consequently the onion
route length. We use two optimization tricks to minimize the size increase of the query header. The ECIES
ciphertext consists of the output from a symmetric key encryption and a 160-bit random number R. One
optimization is that R can be reused for every ECIES encryption in the query5, which is provably secure
as shown in [5]. The other optimization is that kt in Equation 1 can be the same symmetric key used in
the ECIES encryption for ORt. Sit can derive it when it deciphers the onion. Note that the ciphertext of
a symmetric key encryption has almost the same length as its plaintext. Thus, ORj is only slightly longer
than ORj+1 due to the insertion of Sij+1 and pj .
The query generation algorithm outputs (t · Lr + Lc)-bit onions. Let the sensor identities be b bits long.
Therefore, Lc = 160+(b+log t)t. The total onion route size is thus 160+(Lr +b)t+ t log t. Since the payload
of a packet is 115 bytes, we have t = 22 in a conservative estimation, when Lr = b = 16. An Imote2 sensor’s
antenna covers about 30 meters. For larger onion length, we propose two extended constructions in the next
section.
7 Extensions
The scheme presented in Section 5 illustrates the basic idea of using onion routing in a sensor network.
However, this approach is not always fully scalable to large WSNs since we anticipate the onion route length
to be close to the network diameter. Moreover, as the WSN gets larger, the maximum packet size typically
remains the same. This limits the number of hops in the onion route. For this reason, we propose two
extensions: overlay onion routing and hybrid onion routing.
7.1 Overlay Onion Routing
In this approach, Alice randomly picks a set of t+ 1 sensors. However, unlike before, these sensors (Sij and
Sij+1) are not required to be adjacent. This set of sensors, together with Alice’s target sensor Sa (placed at
a random position between 1 and t) form a t + 3-hop overlay onion route starting and ending in GW. The
data collection algorithm and the data recovery algorithm remain unchanged. Transmission between two
elements of the onion route is obtained via WSN’s own routing mechanism. With this approach, the choice
of t is independent of the size of WSN.
Nonetheless, as a result, we trade some privacy for efficiency and scalability. In fact, a compromised
node residing on the route segment between Sij and Sij+1 can learn Sij+1 by simple eavesdropping. Thus,
ADV has a higher probability in learning a hop in an onion route than in the basic scheme. The exact
probability advantage depends on the underlying WSN routing protocol. Since messages in a typical WSN
are transmitted in a broadcast fashion, this probability is non-negligible. (However, simple link encryption
can be used to reduce – but not prevent – such attacks.)
7.2 Hybrid Onion Routing
Both the basic scheme and the overlay extension are geared for WSNs composed of homogeneous sensor
nodes. The concept of heterogeneous sensor networks [38, ?] has been explored recently in order to improve
reliability of data transmissions. This hybrid type of WSN involves a set of powerful backhaul nodes which
form an overlay network, thus allowing high-bandwidth and highly-reliable communications. We can extend
5 The symmetric key cipher we use is also probabilistic. However, its randomness should not be reused.
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our basic scheme by exploiting the features of hybrid WSNs. The main idea is to use overlay onion routing to
forward along a route of randomly chosen backhaul nodes, while these backhaul nodes use our basic scheme
to collect data from regular sensors. We omit any further description of this extension since it is rather
intuitive.
7.3 Query Pattern Privacy
The basic scheme entails Alice using the same route for repeated queries of a given target sensor. Although
this prevents ADV from learning the location of Alice’s target, it exposes Alice’s query patterns. In other
words, given m queries executed by Alice, ADV can derive the frequency distribution of Alice’s targets, even
though their identities are unknown.
One remedy is for Alice to construct a small pool of randomly selected sensors, denoted by Γ . The set
size depends on the size of her target set. When constructing an onion route, Alice selects a fixed number
of onion sensors (say, c) from Γ and t− c− 1 sensors from the entire population of sensors. This way, ADV
can not determine whether a duplicate occurrence of a sensor is due to the retrieval from Γ or Alice’s query
pattern.
8 Conclusions
This paper proposed a technique for ensuring query privacy for on-demand WSN access. We compared our
proposal with related work showing that, to the best of our knowledge, it represents the first mechanism for
query privacy in terms of identity, location, and frequency of queried nodes. We introduced a security model,
whereby the adversary compromises a fraction of nodes, using them to gain information about query targets
and patterns. As part of future work, we plan to implement and test our mechanism in the TinyOS setting
and conduct experiments to obtain better assessment of its overhead.
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Appendix A: ECIES
ECIES [4] is a well-known public key encryption scheme geared for resource-constrained devices, such as sensors.
According to [4], 160-bit ECIES provides roughly the same level of security as 1024-bit RSA encryption. An ECIES
key-pair is usually denoted as (x, Y ), where x is the secret key and Y = xP is the public key. P is a base point on
the elliptic curve defined over Fq where q a 160-bit prime.
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To encrypt a message m using Y , the sender first generates an ephemeral key-pair (r,R) where r ∈R Z∗q and
R = rP . Then, it computes rY and obtains a symmetric encryption key k using a key derivation function (KDF). It
then computes C = Ek(m) where Ek() denotes symmetric encryption under k. The final ECIES ciphertext consists
of R, C and certain integrity checking information. To decrypt, the receiver (who knows the private key x) computes
xR, which allows it to derive k and thus recover m from C.
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